Paramatma in the heart of all is the original source of all knowledge and therefore the ultimate object of knowledge
Pratyaksa, anumana and sabda are the Pramanas
Everything that
one acquires in life comes by a specific means, and this is also true regarding
knowledge. The pramāṇas are a means not only for acquiring knowledge but also
for verifying its validity or invalidity. In simple words, Keśava Miśra gives
the following definitions in his Tarka-bhāṣā (1.2-4):
pramā-karaṇaṁ
pramāṇam, atra pramāṇaṁ lakṣyaṁ, pramā-karaṇaṁ lakṣaṇam
“Pramāṇa is the
proper means for acquiring correct cognition, pramā. Here the means is the
object to be defined, and its being the instrument of such cognition is its
attribute.”
Then, what is pramā, valid knowledge or
correct cognition?
yāthārthānubhavaḥ
pramā
“Pramā is the perception or apprehension of
an object as it really is.”
To summarize it—
an object of knowledge, prameya, can be proved by a valid means of evidence,
pramāṇa, thus resulting in valid knowledge, pramā. Different schools of
philosophy accept or reject different pramāṇas to support their views. Here is
a brief overview:
Pratyakṣa— Direct sense perception. The contact of the five senses— eyes, ears,
nose, tongue and skin, with their respective objects— form, sound, smell, taste
and touch, produce a kind of knowledge that is taken as real by the sentient
being. However, its reliability is subjective, doubtful, and in many
circumstances proved wrong. Under certain conditions, sense perception can be
hampered and mislead one into an erroneous apprehension. For example, the form
of objects in a dim place can create a misperception of their identity. One
cannot see an object that is too far, such as a bird flying very high, nor too
near, such as the eyelids, nor too small, such as the atom. Nor can one see the
stars and planets during the day due to the rays of the sun. Nor can one see
how in milk there is the potential for turning into curd. Under the influence
of some disease or due to mental agitation, one may have a distorted
perception, just as a jaundice patient sees white objects as yellowish and
tastes sugar as bitter. Still, atheistic philosophers like Cārvāka accept only
pratyakṣa as a source of knowledge. The very proposal of a system that rejects
other pramāṇas is ludicrous, for even daily life would be impractical if we
were to completely reject inference and verbal testimony. Therefore, Cārvāka is
mocked by the following verse:
cārvāka
tava cārvāṅgīṁ jārato vīkṣa garbhiṇīm
pratyakṣa-mātra-viśvāso
ghana-śvāsaṁ kim ujjhasi
“Hey, Cārvāka,
who believes only in direct perception! Why are you sighing heavily after
seeing your beautiful wife pregnant by a paramour?”
Moreover,
spiritual knowledge is totally beyond the range of the material senses, as
stated in the Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu (Pūrva-vibhāga 2.234):
ataḥ
śrī-kṛṣṇa-nāmādi na bhaved grāhyam indriyaiḥ
“Therefore
material senses cannot appreciate Kṛṣṇa’s holy name, form, qualities and
pastimes.”
Anumāna— Inference. The knowledge of an object, the major term, by means of
the analysis of another object, the middle term, is called inference. For
instance, by the perception of smoke, the middle term, one may conclude the
presence of fire, the major term. But inference is also not thoroughly
unfailing, for in the given example we see that when a fire is put out by
water, smoke keeps on coming out for some time. Inference is an essential element
in logic, but as far as Brahman is concerned, it is stated in the Kaṭha
Upaniṣad (1.2.9):
naiṣā
tarkeṇa matir apaneyā
“This knowledge cannot be attained by logic.”
In the
Brahmā-sūtra (2.1.11):
tarkāpratiṣṭhānād
api,
“Because logic
is not conclusive.”
In the
Mahā-bhārata (6.6.11), it is said:
acintyāḥ
khalu ye bhāvā na tāṁs tarkeṇa yojayet
“Transcendental
things are certainly inconceivable. One cannot approach them by logic.”
Since the other
pramāṇas, with the exception of śabda, are directly or indirectly dependent on
pratyakṣa or anumāna, and since these are themselves inefficient, their
capacity to lead to valid knowledge is also compromised. The validity of the
knowledge gathered by either pratyakṣa or anumāna can be verified by taking to
another pramāṇa to corroborate it. Jīva Gosvāmī illustrates this point by presenting a quite unusual situation: suppose under a
particular climatic condition, such as in the middle of fog or smoke, one has the
impression of seeing a head flying. For a moment, he might doubt what his eyes
are seeing, but if at that time a voice from the sky states: “Listen, this is
really a head flying,” then even the most unexpected sense perception has to be
trusted…
Ārṣa— Words spoken by the sages. However, it is well known that the sages
disagree among themselves, as the Mahā-bhārata (Vana-parva 313.117) says: nāsāv
ṛṣir yasya mataṁ na bhinnam: “One is not considered a philosopher if his
opinion does not differ from the opinions of other philosophers.”
Upamāna— Comparison. An unknown object can be identified based on the
description of a similar object that is known. Just like one who has never seen
a buffalo may be able to identify it after hearing the description of a cow.
Here it is required that one must have seen a buffalo through direct sense
perception and the other must infer the identity of a buffalo upon seeing one.
Therefore, some do not consider upamāna to be a different pramāṇa.
Arthāpatti— When the cause of an irrevocable fact is not visible but can be
guessed on the basis of evident symptoms, such a deduction is called
arthāpatti. For example, a fat person who is never seen eating during the day
must presumably eat at night, even though unseen by others, for it is a fact
that without eating, nobody can remain fat. Thus, this is considered another
form of inference.
Abhāva— Non-existence. By the non-perception of an object, one gets
knowledge about its absence in a particular place and time. Some consider this
just a negative aspect of direct sense perception, for it is totally dependent
on it.
Sambhava— Inclusion. By means of inclusion, we understand how something is
contained within a group or amount, just as within a hundred people there must
be ten people. This is also a simple way of inference.
Aitihya— Historical evidence. A fact that is known by the public and is
passed from generation to generation, although its original source is unknown,
is called aitihya. Some consider this another form of pratyakṣa, for there must
be an original person who witnessed the events happen. Then again, the
authenticity of the information will depend on the integrity of such a person
and those who transmitted it.
Ceṣṭā— Gestures. One can transmit or acquire knowledge by gestures such as
the movements of the fingers or the head.
Śabda— Super-human (apauruṣeya) verbal testimony. Even ordinary verbal
testimony is accepted in common affairs as evidence for facts that are beyond
one’s experience. For instance, the acknowledgement of one’s father based on
the statement of the mother. The Vedas are the real means for understanding
Brahman, as stated in the śruti:
nāvedavin
manute taṁ bṛhantam (Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, 3.12.7)
“One who does
not know the Vedas does not know the Supreme.”
aupaniṣadaṁ
puruṣaṁ pṛcchāmi (Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 3.9.26)
“I am asking you
about the Supreme Person taught in the Upaniṣads.”
And the
Vedānta-sūtra (1.1.3; 2.1.27) prescribes:
śāstra-yonitvāt
“Because the Supreme Lord should be understood
through the sacred scriptures.”
śrutes
tu śabda-mūlatvāt
“Because the
scriptures are the only basis of knowledge about the Supreme Lord.”
The smṛti
corroborates:
yatra
cādyaḥ pumān āste bhagavān śabda-gocaraḥ
sattvaṁ
viṣṭabhya virajaṁ svānāṁ no mṛḍayan vṛṣaḥ
(Bhāgavatam,
3.15.15)
“In the
Vaikuṇṭha planets is the Supreme Personality of Godhead, Who is the original
person and Who can be understood through the Vedic literature. He is full of
the uncontaminated mode of goodness, with no place for passion or ignorance. He
contributes religious progress for the devotees.”
Being of
super-human origin, the Vedas are free from the four human defects: (1) bhrama
(error), or the tendency to take the real for the unreal or the unreal for the
real, such as a rope for a snake, etc.; (2) pramāda, mistakes arising from
carelessness or inattention; (3) karaṇāpaṭava, limitations of the senses, which
result in erroneous perceptions; and (4) vipralipsā, the desire to deceive. The
Vedas are said to be eternal, emanated from the Supreme Being, and thus not
subjected to human frailties. As stated in the scriptures:
vācā
virūpa nityayā (Ṛg Veda, 8.75.6)
“O Lord Who has
multiple forms, please inspire us to glorify You with the eternal words of the
Vedas.”
anādi-nidhanā
nityā vāg utsṛṣṭā svayambhuvā
ādau
veda-mayī divyā yataḥ sarvāḥ pravṛttayaḥ
(Mahā-bhārata,
12.224.55)
“In the
beginning of creation, the Supreme Lord emitted the eternal, beginningless,
endless, and transcendental words in the form of the Vedas, from which all
other scriptures have come.”
pitṛ-deva-manuṣyāṇāṁ
vedaś cakṣus taveśvara
śreyas
tv anupalabdhe ‘rthe sādhya-sādhanayor api
(Bhāgavatam,
11.20.4)
“My dear Lord,
in order to understand those things beyond direct experience—such as spiritual
liberation or attainment of heaven and other material enjoyments beyond our
present capacity—and in general to understand the means and end of all things,
the forefathers, demigods and human beings must consult the Vedic literatures,
which are Your own laws, for these constitute the highest evidence and
revelation.”
Therefore,
Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism accepts only three kinds of evidence, as corroborated by the
smṛti:
pratyakṣaṁ
cānumānaṁ ca śāstraṁ ca vividhāgamam
trayaṁ
suviditaṁ kāryaṁ dharma-śuddhim abhīpsatā
(Manu-saṁhitā,
12.105)
“One who desires
to attain a clear understanding of dharma should be well conversant with these
three— direct perception, inference, and the various sacred scriptures.”
śrutiḥ
pratyakṣam aitihyam anumānaṁ catuṣṭayam (Bhāgavatam, 11.19.17)
“The Vedas,
direct perception, tradition, and inference— these are the four kinds of
evidence.”
Here pratyakṣa
and anumāna are subordinated to śabda and never independent of it, due to the
above-mentioned reasons.
Now, it may be
argued that śabda refers exclusively to the śruti— the four Saṁhitās, the
Upaniṣads, the Brāhmaṇas, and the Āraṇyakas. In reply to this charge, in his
Tattva Sandarbha, Jīva Gosvāmī extensively elaborated on the authenticity of
the smṛti, particularly of Śrīmad-Bhāgavata Mahā-purāṇa. He says that the
non-difference of the Vedas and the Itihāsa-Purāṇa, on the grounds of the
Itihāsa-Purāṇa being as apauruṣeya as the Ṛg Veda and other Vedas, is implied
in this passage of the Mādhyandina-śruti:
evaṁ vā are ‘sya
mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitam etad yad ṛg-vedo yajur-vedaḥ sāma-vedo ‘tharvāṅgirasa
itihāsaḥ purāṇam (Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Up., 2.4.10)
“Thus indeed the breath of this Supreme Being
constitutes the Ṛg Veda, Yajur Veda, Sāma Veda, Atharvāṅgirasa Veda, Itihāsa,
and Purāṇa”
In this way,
Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism accepts pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda as means for obtaining
valid knowledge but particularly emphasizes that śabda is the only consistent
means for spiritual enlightenment. Here, however, there are several conditions
under which śabda can progressively fructify, such as detachment and
experienced knowledge, which in their turn are all interdependent, being the
natural result of the practical application of the instructions received from
the scriptures.
